A Service Oriented Architecture aims to facilitate interaction of loosely coupled services in large-scale dynamic systems. Despite a decade's active research and development, Web Services still remain undependable (Bourne et al., 2012) . In literature many proposals attempt to overcome interoperability issues, particularly typical of not-orchestrated Web Service (WS) compositions. Although these techniques aid to discover potential interoperability mismatches, they do not fit well with flexibility and dynamism, desirable characteristics e.g. in choreographies. Here unsafe run-time changes may compromise a correct execution. To support such dynamism and to mitigate the effects of such failures, we propose a flexible architecture able to realize dynamic WS compositions, supporting run-time monitoring and verification techniques. The technique we chose is a novel run-time algorithm capable to predict potential failures that can happen in near future states of a choreography. It admits an integration "a-priori" and monitors the run-time services behaviour to provide information about possible errors when these can happen.
INTRODUCTION
Nowadays software is not anymore a single artifact that can be fully designed at design-time. Building complex systems from scratch is a very costly effort and often not successful. The current trend is to assemble a system similarly to a jigsaw puzzle. Once requirements and policies are established, existing software components are discovered and assembled to reach the prefixed goal. But whereas jigsaw puzzle pieces are made pluggable into each other by the same company, the systems to be integrated rarely are. Utilizing existing components means expecting that they will safely interact with each other, even if made independently by different companies. When properties as flexibility and dynamism are required, interoperability issues become even more complicated. For instance this is the case of SOA-based and Future Internet-oriented applications (Baresi et al., 2006) . This kind of systems are made mostly by already existing WSs that provide just their public interfaces over internet. They may come from partially unknown third parties, thus further limiting the trust on their correctness and unmalicious behavior.
Such complex systems made by composing WSs as they were components, can be grouped in two main categories: orchestrated and not-orchestrated. In both of them, WSs are viewed as black-box components that interact with each other to reach the system goal. Briefly, an orchestration of WSs has one central coordinator (orchestrator). It manages the message exchange among the services following an executable business process. On the other hand, a notorchestrated service composition like a choreography, focuses on the global protocol running between WSs rather than on their local coupling. Each component here knows requirements to interact with the others, and covers just at run-time a pre-fixed role. Assuming that a set of composable WSs is available at runtime in a system, they should interact on their own to reach the choreography goal. It is easy to see the additional effort required to grant robustness and safe interactions in a system without a central point of coordination. However, the lack of centralized coordination permits a more flexible system, where components can be dynamically bounded at run-time to a choreography role. This means that a WS could potentially enter, leave or be substituted while the whole system is being operated.
In this setting two main problems limit the possibility of software-quality related activities to operate in advance. One is the possible late integration of services in dynamic compositions, that makes it difficult to check the correctness of the resulting composition before the execution. On the other hand, the number of all the possible configurations for such systems may be unmanageable according to (Morin et al., 2009) , and it may become impossible to validate all of them in advance. Moreover not all the services expose their internal behavior, so projections or empirical behaviors are assumed for the composition validation. This can lead to unsafe run-time changes that may imply interoperability issues, since new interactions may emerge. In such a context, traditional testing and static analysis strategies may not be enough. In literature many proposals attempt to overcome interoperability issues. Many of them focus on the correct-by-construction strategy like (Autili et al., 2015) , or on static verification like choreography realizability (Basu et al., 2012) and protocol compatibility (Elia et al., 2014) . Although these techniques aid to discover potential interoperability mismatch, they do not fit well with characteristics like flexibility and dynamism of WS compositions. Moreover, often they are too time-expensive, especially with the emergence of short living compositions. In this scenario new verification techniques are emerging, that take advantage of both design-and run-time verification activities. Nevertheless, the underlying architecture must support them, in addition to the high dynamism of the system.
According to Cassandra (De Angelis et al., 2014), we think that it could be more fruitful to permit the services integration "a-priori", and then provide dynamic run-time validation and verification activities. Cassandra proposes a novel run-time monitoring and verification algorithm in order to detect possible failures in near future states of a choreography. The strategy identifies the current execution state, and then drives the construction of predictions that look to a number k of steps ahead of the current execution state. For this purpose a flexible architecture is needed, able to manage frequent run-time changes and that allows a verification strategy to monitor the system knowing the current execution state.
The goal of this research paper is to propose an architecture, hidden from the services point of view, able to manage dynamic WS compositions as choreographies, and to support run-time verification techniques like the above-mentioned Cassandra approach. This paper contributes to the state-of-the-art in online failure prediction of service composition in this respect: i) it introduces an architecture able to support integration-failures prediction at run-time in dynamic SOA systems; ii) it explains why existing services have not to be modified with our approach, externalizing message handling and monitoring; iii) it provides a concrete implementation of the approach, using Cassandra as assessment.
Section 2 provides some introductory material on Interface Automata, used to explain WSs composition. Then the proposed architecture is explained in 3. Section 4 introduces the Cassandra approach, since it has been used as verification technique in our concrete implementation described in Section 5. Related work are discussed in Section 6 while Section 7 concludes the paper and provides a list of future research directions. Definition 1. An interface automaton is a tuple P = V P ,V init P , A I P , A O P , A H P , T P where:
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
• V P is a set of states and V init P is a set of initial states that contains at most one state.
• A I P , A O P and A H P are mutually disjoint sets of input, output and internal actions. We define A P = A I P ∪ A O P ∪ A H P .
• T P ⊆ V P × A P ×V P is a set of steps.
We say that an action a ∈ A P is enabled at a state v ∈ V P if there is a step (v, a, v 
A O P (v) and A H P (v) are the subsets of input, output and internal actions that are enabled at v and
is the set of action enabled at v. A key feature is that IA are not required to be input-enabled, i.e. we do not assume that A I P (v) = A I P for each v ∈ V P . The inputs in A I P \A I P (v) are called illegal inputs at v. The set of input steps is the subset of steps T I P = {(v, a, u) ∈ T P | a ∈ A I P } ⊆ T P . Similarly we define the sets T O P and T H P of output and internal steps. Moreover, a state u is reachable from v if there is an execution sequence, namely an alternating sequence of states and actions of the form
Two IA are mutually composable if their set of actions are disjoint, except that some input actions of one automaton can be output actions of the other one.
Definition 2. Two interface automata P and Q are
Essentially, P and Q are composable whenever they only share some input and output actions and, hence,
. If two IA P and Q are composable, their product P ⊗ Q is a IA which set of states is V P × V Q and that will synchronize on shared actions, while asynchronously interleave all other (i.e. internal) actions. Since P and Q are not required to be input-enabled, their product P ⊗ Q may have one or more states where one component produces an output that the other one is not able to accept. The states where this happens are called illegal.
Illegal states represent error states that the composed system should not be able to reach. Indeed, two interface automata P and Q can be used together if there is at least a legal environment, i.e. an environment that can prevent P ⊗ Q from entering its illegal states.
We assume that each WS in a choreography provides a run-time model definition IA-equivalent, describing its behavior and how it interacts with the environment. In some real context this assumption can be judged a bit strong, but in literature it is easy to find techniques to derive such models. One of them, suggested by (Shoham et al., 2008) , is a client-side mining of specifications based on static code analysis. Another technique could be the use of the Test Suites proposed by (De Angelis et al., 2013) . They are used to verify if a service is able to cover a specific role in a choreography. If that is the case, we can consider the projection of that role as the runtime model of that service. However the real behavior could be more complex than the provided model, so unpredictable interactions could emerge, visible only monitoring at run-time. The architecture we propose in the next section supports both real-time monitoring and failure prediction techniques based on provided run-time models.
A FLEXIBLE ARCHITECTURE
This section introduces the structure of the architecture we propose. Its aim is to allow safer services integration "a-priori" in choreographies, since supported monitoring and predictions techniques will discover potential errors in time, without modifying the internal business logic of the participating services. The architecture adopts the Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) design pattern to make heterogeneous services exchange messages, while an integration framework is used to implement the choreography specification.
We assume that each participant service can be explicitly added and removed from the ESB registry. As explained later in this chapter, once added, each participating service will be bound to an ESB bundle according to the role it covers. Such a bundle will address messages and notify the monitoring algorithms, externalizing also error handling from the real services. We refer to the ESB as a single logic unit. However it could be distributed among several implementation to support scalability (Hanumantharayappa, 2014) .
For our concrete architecture implementation, we chose "ServiceMix" (SMX) as ESB provider and "Camel" as integration framework. After a brief introduction to the just mentioned technologies, we describe the proposed architecture analyzing our concrete implementation.
Technological Background

Apache ServiceMix
Apache ServiceMix (http://servicemix.apache.org) is a flexible, open-source integration container. It provides a complete Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) powered by OSGi. An ESB is a software architecture model used to allow the communication between mutually interacting software applications in a serviceoriented architecture (SOA). As opposed to the clientserver model, the ESB promotes agility and flexibility. SMX can be run as a standalone provider or as a service within another ESB. It provides messaging, routing and Enterprise Integration Patterns (EIP) with Apache Camel, introduced in the next subsection. SMX is built on top of Karaf (http://karaf.apache.org), so it can be used also as OSGi container. We use this feature to install OSGi bundles to extend its features and routing rules.
Apache Camel
Apache Camel (http://camel.apache.org) is an opensource Java framework that allows easier integrations, implementing the standard EIPs using Java, XML, or Scala. It aims to address the problem of dealing with the specifics of applications and transports, and the problem to use a good solution to integration problems. Camel uses its components, that provide an Endpoint interface, to add connectivity to different systems and different transports (http, rest, soap,...). To manipulate and mediate messages in between endpoints, Camel uses EIPs defined as processors. To wire processors and endpoints together, multiple DSLs languages can be used, such as Java, Scala or Spring.
The Architecture
The solution we propose in this paper, aims to build a flexible architecture able to support the execution of dynamic choreographies with real-time monitoring to discover unpredictable messages. Furthermore, it supports failure-predictions techniques based on provided WSs run-time model.
Realize a Choreography
We use SMX as the core component. It will be responsible to address the messages, connect the services and notify the verification algorithms. In our solution SMX is a standalone provider, accessible from all the potential participants of a choreography. Due to its OSGi extensible structure, together with Camel routing capability, it can realize a choreography specification. A choreography, regardless the language used to model it, specifies the roles and the communication rules. We represent roles in SMX with OSGi bundles we call role-bundle. So given a choreography, for each role a relative role-bundle is created and installed on SMX. The installation of bundles can be performed even at run-time. For now we can consider the role-bundles just as reference to roles, since each of them has a defined endpoint. They do not have a business logic, that instead is implemented by the service. Actually we will see later that the bundles can be used to perform actions such as transforming messages and sending notifications.
When a service enters in a choreography, we assume it provides its behavior (used by the prediction activities) and its endpoint to the ESB, in our case SMX. A route then is created at run-time between that service and the role-bundle relative to the role it covers. We call these routes dynamic, since they can change during a choreography execution. A dynamic route connects the role-bundle to the up-to-date endpoint of the current service performing that role. However, even if several different services can cover the same role over time, the endpoint of the relative role-bundle remains unchanged. The Fig. 1 shows the described architecture, representing the OSGi rolebundles as small octagons plugged into SMX.
All the messages of a service will be sent to the endpoint of the role-bundle relative to the role the service covers through dynamic routes. Services are not aware of the architecture neither of the static routing rules nor the endpoints of the other services. Static routes are those that implement the choreography specification, and they do not change along the choreography execution. They connect the role-bundles to each other, and address the messages following the choreography rules. When a role-bundle will receive a message from another role-bundle through a static route, it will send the message to the receiver service through a dynamic route.
The distinction between static and dynamic routes is just logic, they are defined in the same way and they are hidden from the outside. In our case, using Camel, they can be written in several languages including DSL-Java and Spring-XML. This allows to easily derive routes from a choreography, and easily update dynamic routes at run-time, according to current available services. In addition to routing, Camel allows also to handle messages before redirecting them to the receiver. Messages can be parsed and transformed, making interoperable even services implemented in different ways.
Verification Techniques Integration
We saw how a choreography could be realized with a very flexible and dynamic architecture. Now we are going to see how to use verification techniques like real-time monitoring and failure prediction. In our scenario we consider to have verification algorithms implemented in a remote service, we call VerSer, linked to an OSGi bundle of SMX, just like the other participant services. We call observer the bundle linked to VerSer, as shown by Fig. 1 . To improve performance and to reduce latency, VerSer algorithms could also be implemented as an OSGi bundle, becoming part of SMX. We prefer to keep VerSer detached from SMX to be more flexible, and to be ready for distributed versions.
In order to make predictions, VerSer must be aware of the services behavior and of the messages actually exchanged by each other. For this purpose, the role-bundles must notify the observer about the messages received from the participating services. The observer in turn notifies VerSer making it able to monitor the message exchange. Besides the exchanged messages, also actions like "add" or "remove" of a service must be notified to VerSer.
In our proposed architecture, each participant must provide its Interface Automaton equivalent runtime model. When the service enters in the system, its run-time model will be sent to VerSer using a special message. Likewise, when a service leaves the choreography, a special message is sent to VerSer in order to update its prediction mechanisms. Notifications are automatically sent by role-bundles to the observer through camel routes we call notice-route, just as the other routing rules. The notice-routes are represented in Fig. 1 by dashed arrows. This solution permits participating services to ignore the verification mechanisms. If VerSer predicts a potential future failure, it will notify the concerned role-bundle. This permits to externalize error-handling techniques, implementing them in the role-bundles without modify the existing services.
Referring to the example of Fig. 1 , the use of the routes to send the "msg1" from the service C could be the following. When the WS C wants to send the "msg1" to A, the message is sent to the fixed endpoint of role-bundle C. Then, the message is forwarded to the observer through the notice route RoleC→Observer. At this point the Observer redirects "msg1" to VerSer through the dynamic route Observer→VerSer, so that the latter can monitor the system and update its prediction. Then the prediction is sent back to the fixed endpoint of the Observer, that redirects it to the concerned role-bundle C. If no failure will be predicted, i.e. no protocol mismatches will be expected performing "msg1", the message will be sent to RoleA through the static route RoleC→RoleA. In turn, the message will be forwarded through the dynamic route RoleA→ServiceA.
To assess our architecture we use cassandra, described in Sec. 4, as verification technique to be deployed as VerSer.
CASSANDRA
To test our architecture with real monitoring and prediction activities, we chose CASSANDRA (De Angelis et al., 2014), an approach to forecast possible failures in the dynamic integration of software components. The usual approach to the modeling of a component that interacts with other components is pessimistic; the basic assumption is that the environment can behave as it likes and that two components can be composed if no environment can lead them into an error state. Cassandra approach is optimistic, permitting services integration "a-priori", and then providing run-time monitoring and verification activities. It explores design-time system models together with events observed at run-time to check if a possible illegal state is reachable. The exploration strategy builds a global design-time model (exploration tree) looking just k steps ahead starting from the current system state monitored at run-time. In this paper we assume that the value of k is defined by the user. In order to make near future prediction, Cassandra should have an up-to-date view over the participating services and the exchanged messages. For example, if a participant leaves the choreography at run-time, the notification of the "remove" will allow Cassandra to update the illegal states of the exploration tree.
Cassandra Overview
This online failure prediction algorithm relies on a specification of the component behaviour based on the IA formalism shown in Sec. 2. The algorithm suitably composes the specifications of those components under execution. Nevertheless, instead of using the classical composition operator, Cassandra uses a slightly different one more suitable for the online prediction of failures in a dynamic environment. According to this composition operator any pair of components sharing a set of I/O actions can be integrated. Then, the composed automata is navigated by looking ahead to the current execution state. It is the task of the failure prediction approach to check whether the system is approaching an illegal state, and so to inform a possible failure avoidance mechanism that will possibly take care of repair actions. In the Cassandra approach, an illegal state corresponds to an integration failure by any path shorter than k steps and originating in the current state. In a sense, we assume that an illegal state can be reached as consequence of a wrong invocation/message done by one component on a component that either is not willing to accept it in the current state or does not exist at all. Fig. 2 shows a client-server scenario used to explain the Cassandra algorithm. The sender asks the server to write or read on receiver's file. The services cannot always correctly cooperate since they make different assumptions on their respective behaviour. The sender assumes that after a successful opening, the resource can be used through the server without receiving any failure. The server may connect with the receiver through a not reliable medium, and can return a failure. According to the standard IA theory the two automata cannot be composed, since the server may send a f ail message while the sender is not able to receive it. However Cassandra let them interact, since if no connection failures occur, the sender will successful access the receiver's file. A snippet of the exploration tree derived by Cassandra is shown by Fig. 3 , assuming a prediction of 2 steps ahead. The color of illegal states is red.
Cassandra as VerSer
Cassandra can be integrated in our architecture as the VerSer, creating a dynamic route to the observer. As Cassandra does, we assume the services behavior IAequivalent, are described by a SCXML (State Machine Notation for Control Abstraction) specification, i.e. a general-purpose event-based state machine language. When a service participate in a choreography, it is added to the SMX registry and a dynamic route is created towards the relative role-bundle. Moreover, a special message is sent to Cassandra, notifying the "add" of the service and providing its SCXML specification. This process is showed by Figure 4 , where the service "C" referenced from Fig. 1 is going to participate in a choreography, providing its endpoint (c end point), the role it wants to cover (role c) and its behavior (c scxml). In the same way, when a service is explicitly removed from the SMX registry, a special message is sent to Cassandra which updates its exploration tree with new illegal states. Services can be added and removed even at runt-time, during a choreography execution. The characterization of the states in the exploration tree will result from the observed events and the actual configuration of the system to make predictions used by a fault management strategy or used for logging and analysis purpose without altering the services implementation. During the execution of the system, at logical level each participant asks Cassandra for a prediction before sending a message to the receiver service. The prediction is returned to the participant synchronously to the system execution and the management of the possible futures is left to the service. Actually this strategy is implemented by routing rules and role-bundles behaviors. Indeed, each role-bundle will redirect messages from services to the observer through the notice routes asking for a prediction. Once the prediction is available, an answer is sent back by the observer. The role-bundle then, if no illegal states are reached by the exploration tree, it will deliver the message to the receiver role through the static route, or it will handle the potential failure otherwise.
This strategy allows to check in advance if an action can be performed safely, i.e. it does not lead to a failure. It checks that the receiver service is active and its current state is able to accept that message from the sender. This strategy increases latency of the system, but grants system consistency and safer interactions. As stated in (De Angelis et al., 2014) , the complexity of Cassandra failure prediction algorithm mainly depends on the size (in terms of number of nodes and edges) of the exploration tree. Its creation and its exploration have a time complexity in O(N k ), so it increases according the number of steps to forecast in the future (which relates to the value of k), rather than the number of total interactions in the system.
ASSESSMENT
This section analyzes a scenario we used as use-case for assessment of Cassandra with the architecture we proposed. For the sake of readability we used a very simple scenario, with the intent to show the feasibility of the architecture. The scenario models a SingleSign-On choreography, with three roles: user agent (Usr), Identity Provider (IdP) and Service Provider (SP). The Usr requests the access to a resource to the SP, that in turn asks to the Usr an authentication token. Then the Usr asks the IdP to be authenticated. If the user is successful authenticated, the token will be sent back in the response. Only at this point the Usr can access to the SP resources. This scenario is illustrated by Fig. 5 .
We assume that Cassandra is aware of the services behavior, represented by SCXML files. Though our solution is independent from the services implementation, we chose to implement services as Java remote Akka actors. Akka (http://akka.io) is an open-source actor-based toolkit and runtime supporting Java and Scala. It simplifies the construction of concurrent and distributed applications. An actor in Akka is the smallest unit of an application. It is a container for State, Behavior and Mailbox. A State, similar to an explicit state machine, is used to compare the Cassandra prediction with the services real current state. The Behavior is the action to be taken, according to the current state and the message received. The Behavior is defined with an event-based approach, making actors interact through asynchronous messages, enqueued in their Mailboxes. Akka provides also selfhealing techniques if an actor reaches an inconsistent state, recovering a previous state. We chose Akka because of the features listed above, allowing us to consider them as remote services with an exposed behavior. Even the Cassandra algorithm has been implemented as an Akka actor, installed directly in ServiceMix as an OSGi bundle without the observer. In our demo we have three remote Akka actors and ServiceMix that provides three role-bundles and one bundle acting as a local Cassandra service. Actually all the components are deployed in the same machine (2,4 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo, 4GB ram) but with different endpoints to simulate a distributed system. Different tests have been performed on the SSO scenario, changing the prediction steps ahead (k). Analyzing costs of the tests, we got the values listed by Tab. 1. Analysis are made on executions of 9 seconds.
With the scenario we used, our tests proved the efficacy of the proposed architecture with the failure prediction approach Cassandra. Though, more complex systems should be tested in real evolving dis- tributed scenarios. We are confident in positive results even with complex scenarios since, as stated in Sec. 4, the time complexity of the predictions is not strictly related to the number of interactions of a system.
RELATED WORK
This section provides related work on failure prediction, and run-time verification of dynamically evolving systems.
The most significant paper on online failure prediction can be most probably considered the survey conducted by Salfner et al. in (Salfner et al., 2010) . This survey analyzes and compares a number of existing online failure prediction methods, proposing a taxonomy to classify the existing online failure prediction methods. Most of them use heuristics, statistics or probabilistic models to predict potential future failures. We developed Cassandra as online failure prediction for choreographies, but the presented architecture could also be used in general dynamically evolving systems.
Our proposed solution could be adapted to be used even with different approaches from Cassandra. A considerable number of approaches have been developed for run-time monitoring of dynamically evolving systems, as in (Chatley et al., 2004; Barringer et al., 2007) . The authors in (Chatley et al., 2004) show how it is possible to generate a snapshot of the structure of a running application, and how this can be combined with behavioral specifications for com-ponents to check compatibility against system properties. In (Barringer et al., 2007) it is described a mechanisms for combining programs from separate components and an operational semantics for programmed evolvable systems. In (Goldsby et al., 2007) a run-time monitoring and verification technique is proposed, which can check whether dynamically adaptive software satisfies its requirements. In (Filieri et al., 2012) KAMI is proposed to support fault detection. It shares similar goals with Cassandra, even if we focus on functional failures and them on non functional properties. The work in shares with Cassandra monitor functional properties in dynamically evolving systems for inferring a run-time model of it. without failure prediction.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has proposed a concrete architecture to realize dynamic WS compositions, capable of supporting run-time failure prediction with the Cassandra approach. This approach captures the current state of a service-based system through monitoring its execution to check potential protocol mismatches in the near future. The proposed architecture, based on an ESB and an Integration Framework, allows services to be dynamically composed, exchanging messages following choreography rules. The whole system can be monitored at run-time, without modifying the participating services. Our demo, although tested on a light scenario, demonstrates a concrete implementation to make use of the Cassandra algorithm. We are confident that the approach is quite promising, even if technical and theoretical problems must be still solved.
As future work, we want to investigate a technique to automatically derive role-bundle and static routes from a choreography specification. Moreover, we want to use our architecture with monitoring capabilities to automatic repair at run-time unrealizable choreographies. As we allow the a-priori integration of services, we want to optimistically realize choreographies, even if they may be not-realizable. Our idea is to provide role-bundles with automatic choreography-repair techniques, activated if possible interoperability errors are predicted.
